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Red Antisemitism: Anti-Jewish Violence and 
Revolutionary Politics in Ukraine, 1919 
by Brendan McGeever 
 
 
Abstract 
 
When the Bolsheviks came to power in 1917, they announced the overthrow of a 
world scarred by exploitation and domination. In the very moment of 
revolution, these sentiments were put to the test as antisemitic pogroms swept 
across the former Pale of Jewish Settlement. The pogroms reached a devastating 
peak in the year 1919, marking the most violent chapter in pre-Holocaust modern 
Jewish history. A century of scholarship has conclusively shown that most of the 
atrocities were perpetrated by forces hostile to the Revolution. But antisemitism 
was not the preserve of the counterrevolution: it manifested across the political 
divide, finding traction among the revolutionary left, as well. 
This article examines the nature and extent of antisemitism in the Red Army and 
more generally the Bolshevik movement in Ukraine in the spring and summer of 
1919. In bringing together internal Bolshevik security reports, memoirs, 
newspapers, and Party and governmental communications, the article shows that 
revolution and antisemitism could be overlapping as well as competing 
worldviews. It does so by offering an analytical framing of Red Army 
antisemitism: drawing on works in Critical Theory, it brings into view the 
importance of class relations, and uncovers the complex ways in which 
antisemitism could find expression in revolutionary politics. 
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Introduction 
 
The Russian Revolution of 1917 promised a world free not only of class 
exploitation, but of gendered and racialized forms of domination, as well. In the 
very moment of revolution, however, this vision was put to the test as mass 
outbreaks of antisemitic violence spread across the former Pale of Jewish 
Settlement. The pogroms posed fundamental questions of the Bolshevik project, 
and revealed the nature and extent of antisemitism among sections of the 
working class and peasantry. Even more troubling for the Party leadership was 
the depth of antisemitism in Soviet institutions at the local level, and in 
particular, within the Red Army.  
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Fig. 1: ”The distribution of Jewish pogroms according to their organisers.” Poster produced by the Jewish 
Social Committee for the Relief of Victims of Pogroms (Evobshchestkom) for an exhibition on pogroms 
in Moscow in 1923 (Archives of the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research). 
 
 
A century of literature on the Russian Civil War pogroms has demonstrated that 
the arc of anti-Jewish violence peaked in the year 1919, and that most of the 
atrocities were carried out by forces hostile to the Revolution.1 What remains less 
 
1 On the Russian Civil War pogroms, see: N. I. Shtif, Pogromy na Ukraine (period 
dobrovol’cheskoi armii), (Berlin: Wostok, 1922); Elias Tcherikower, Istoriia pogromnogo 
dvizheniia na Ukraine 1917-1921, (Berlin: Ostjüdisches Historisches Archiv, 1923); Id., Di ukrainer 
pogromen in yor 1919, (New York: YIVO Institute for Jewish Research, 1965); Joseph B. 
Shechtman, Pogromy dobrovol’cheskoi armii na Ukraine (k istorii antisemitizma na Ukraine v 
1919-1920 gg.), (Berlin: Ostjüdisches Historisches Archiv, 1932); Nahum Gergel, “The Pogroms in 
the Ukraine in 1918-1921,” YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Science 6 (1951): 237-251; Peter Kenez, 
“Pogroms and White Ideology in the Russian Civil War,” in Pogroms: Anti-Jewish Violence in 
Modern Russian History, eds. John D. Klier, Shlomo Lambroza, (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992); Oleg V. Budnitskii, “Jews, Pogroms, and the White Movement: A 
Historiographical Critique,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 2/4 (2001): 1-
23; Id., Rossiiskie evrei mezhdu krasnymi i belymi, 1917-1920, (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2005); Lidia 
Borisovna Miliakova, Kniga pogromov: pogromy na Ukraine, v Belorussii i evropeiskoi chasti 
Rossii v period grazhdanskoi voiny 1918-1922 gg. Sbornik dokumentov, (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 
2008); Anti-Jewish Violence: Rethinking the Pogrom in East European History, eds. Johathan 
Dekel-Chen et al. (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2011); Vladimir Prokhorovich 
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well known, however, is the extent of antisemitism in the Red Army during this 
period. In his classic study, Gergel calculated that the Red Army was responsible 
for 8.6% of the civil war pogroms, while the Petliura and Denikin armies were 
culpable for 40% and 17.2%, respectively.2 In other words, the Red Army was the 
least prone to anti-Jewish violence of all the military forces in the civil war. 
Important though these statistics are, however, they do not capture the traction 
antisemitism often found among Red Army units during this period, including 
among those that did not participate in the pogroms. 
 
That antisemitism could be found in the Red Army during the Russian Civil 
War should come as no surprise. In his classic collection of short stories, Red 
Cavalry, published in the early 1930s in the Soviet Union, Isaac Babel famously 
captured the ferocity of anti-Jewish violence perpetrated by the Red Army 
during the Soviet-Polish War of 1919-1921. Most memorable is his character 
Gedali, who, faced with violence coming from all sides, poses the haunting 
question: “who is to tell which is the Revolution and which the 
counterrevolution?”.3 Despite the international popularity of Babel’s writings, 
however, Red Army pogroms have remained relatively under-examined in the 
literature on the Russian Revolution and subsequent civil war. 
 
Recent studies by Russian historians Oleg Budnitskii and Vladimir Buldakov 
have gone some way to addressing this oversight.4 This article builds on these 
works in three ways. First, it gives a deeper, more granular account of pogromist 
violence and antisemitic sentiment within the Red Army in Ukraine than has 
been available to date. It does so by bringing together internal Bolshevik security 
reports (svodki),5 memoirs, newspapers, and internal Party and governmental 
 
Buldakov, Khaos i etnos: etnicheskie konflikty v Rossii, 1917-1918 gg. Usloviia vozniknoveniia, 
khronika, kommentarii, analiz, (Moskva: Novyi khronograf, 2010). 
2 Gergel, “The Pogroms in the Ukraine in 1918-1921,” 248. 
3 Isaac Babel, Red Cavalry, transl. Peter Constantine, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
2003), 65. 
4 Oleg V. Budnitskii, “The Reds and the Jews, or the Comrades in the Arms of the Military 
Reporter Liutov,” in The Enigma of Isaac Babel. Biography, History, Context., ed. G. Freidin, 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 118-121; Id., Rossiiskie evrei mezhdu krasnymi i 
belymi; Buldakov, Khaos i etnos;: Id., “Freedom, Shortages, Violence: The Origins of the 
‘Revolutionary Anti-Jewish Pogrom’ in Russia, 1917-1918,” in Anti-Jewish Violence, eds. Dekel-
Chen et al, 74-94.  
5 Since the opening of the former Soviet archives, there has been fruitful debate about the 
limitations of internal Party, government, and Cheka/NKVD reports (svodki), which ostensibly 
provide insight into the “moods” of the Soviet population. These discussions have largely 
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communications to offer a comprehensive account of the nature and extent of 
antisemitism in the Red Army and the Bolshevik movement in Ukraine overall. 
Second, in examining antisemitism in the context of the spring and summer of 
1919 – the deadliest period of antisemitic violence during the civil war – the 
article provides an empirically driven analysis of a crucial chapter in the history of 
pre-Holocaust Eastern European Jewish history. Third, it offers an analytical 
framing of Red Army antisemitism by drawing on the works of Critical Theory. 
This attentiveness to theory brings into view the importance of class and class 
relations in antisemitic representations of Jewishness - a hitherto overlooked 
dimension of the civil war pogroms. In doing so, the article uncovers complex 
ways in which antisemitism could overlap with and find expression through 
revolutionary politics.  
 
 
Ukraine on the Eve of the 1919 Pogroms  
 
To understand how antisemitism found traction within the Bolsheviks’ social 
base in Ukraine in 1919, it will be useful to offer a sketch of the Ukrainian social 
 
focused on the use of such sources for the Stalin era; this article, in contrast, relies extensively on 
svodki from the earlier, civil war period. Nevertheless, the limitations of these documents need to 
be noted. As critics have pointed out, these reports reveal less about popular opinions than they 
do about Soviet government perceptions of them. To mitigate this tension, Lesley Rimmel 
suggests garnering as broad a range of svodki as possible, including examples from both 
“peripheral” and central regions. To an extent, this article achieves this by examining svodki in 
each and every province of Ukraine for the year 1919. These reports were carried out every two to 
three days throughout the year by Bolsheviks on the ground, and they cover both rural and urban 
regions of the country. Nevertheless, to make inferences about the extent of antisemitism based 
purely on, say, Red Army svodki is problematic, not least because these sources tend to chart 
sudden sharp increases in antisemitism, not the longer-term patterning of such sentiments. To 
balance this, the article also draws on newspaper sources and memoirs to broaden the analysis. 
On the usage of svodki in Soviet history, see Terry D. Martin, “Obzory OGPU i sovetskie 
istoriki,” in “Sovershenno Sekretno”: Lubianka - Stalinu o polozhenii v strane (1922-1934 gg.) 
Tom 1 Chast’ 1, (Moscow: Institut Rossiiskoi Istorii Rossiiskoi Akademii Nauk, 2001); Lesley A. 
Rimmel, “Svodki and Popular Opinion in Stalinist Leningrad,” Cahiers Du Monde Russe : 
Russie, Empire Russe, Union Soviétique, États Indépendants 40/1 (1999): 217-234; Peter 
Holquist, “Letter,” Slavic Review 55/3 (1996): 719; Tracy McDonald, Face to the Village: The 
Riazan Countryside Under Soviet Rule, 1921-1930, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011); 
Sarah Davies, Popular Opinion in Stalin’s Russia: Terror, Propaganda and Dissent, 1934-1941, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Timothy Johnston, Being Soviet: Identity, 
Rumour, and Everyday Life Under Stalin 1939-1953, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 
xliv–xlvi. 
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formation during the revolutionary period.6 Ukraine in 1919 was a society 
markedly polarized by class and ethnicity. In urban regions, the working class 
was overwhelmingly comprised of Ukraine’s minority ethnic populations - above 
all, Russians and Jews.7 Moreover, those sections of the working class which were 
ethnically Ukrainian tended to be politically and culturally oriented to Russia.8 
In sharp contrast, the vast rural regions were overwhelmingly Ukrainian.9 The 
first Soviet census of 1926 captured it well: while Ukrainians constituted 80 
percent of the total population of Ukraine, they represented a mere 4 percent of 
the industrial working class. At the same time, they totaled 91 percent of the 
peasantry, and according to some historians, the corresponding figure may have 
been as high as 97 percent in 1917.10 Those who were Ukrainian by ethnicity thus 
frequently found themselves to be minorities in the major cities, and in no case 
did they ever constitute the majority of the urban population.11 These dynamics 
had significant implications for class relations. Nationality, ethnicity, and class 
frequently manifested as interlocking experiences; consequently, relations 
between urban traders and peasants were intersectional in character: they were 
simultaneously processes of class and identity formation. In Ukrainian peasant 
popular culture, the “city man” represented a ruthless profiteer, an oppressor of 
the poor Ukrainian toiler. The crisis of the revolutionary period frequently 
provided the foil for these representations to come to the fore, particularly when 
the breakdown of exchange channels left peasants without vital manufactured 
goods such as boots, cloth, nails, and ploughs.12 In Ukraine, the national 
 
6 The term “social base” is used in this article to refer not only to Party members, but also more 
broadly to those components of society on which the Bolsheviks depended to secure power in 
Ukraine. Significantly, this included Red Army soldiers, many of whom were not Party 
members. In a context of all out Civil War in 1919, Bolshevik power in Ukraine, wherever it 
existed, was largely a militarized form of statecraft.  
7 Jurij Borys, The Sovietization of Ukraine, 1917-1923: The Communist Doctrine and Practice of 
National Self-Determination, (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1980), 70-71. 
8 Edward Hallett Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923, Vol. 1, (London: Penguin Books, 
1950); Liliana Riga, The Bolsheviks and the Russian Empire, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012). 
9 Leon Trotsky, Trotsky’s History of the Russian Revolution, Vol. 3, (London: Sphere Books, 
1967), 46. 
10 Henry Abramson, A Prayer for the Government. Ukrainians and Jews in Revolutionary Times, 
1917-1920, (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1999), 16. 
11 Borys, The Sovietization of Ukraine, 64-67. 
12 Arthur E. Adams, Bolsheviks in the Ukraine: Second Campaign, 1918-1919, (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1963), 10. 
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question was keenly felt at the point of production, and in particular, in the 
realm of distribution and exchange.13  
 
 
“Down with the Communists, long live Soviet Rule!” 
 
This had profound political consequences. Writing in early June 1919, the 
Bolshevik Nikolai Podvoiskii admitted that the Party’s only real semblance of 
governmental power was in the capital cities of Kharkiv, Ekaterinoslav, Poltava, 
and Chernihiv;14 all industrial regions located in the east and northeast of the 
country, heavily populated by so-called “non-Ukrainians.” These contradictions 
found expression in popular representations of Bolshevik rule, which, in the eyes 
of many Ukrainians, was “foreign” and “urban.”15 In the popular Ukrainian 
imaginary, “the Communist” was a construct defined by the intersections of 
class, ethnicity, and place: Communists were urban dwellers, non-Ukrainians 
who stood aloof from peasant life; they were “Russian oppressors” and, above 
all, “speculating Jews.”16 
 
These representations were taken up in revolutionary politics, particularly 
among sections of the radicalized Ukrainian peasantry, which in 1919 began to 
mobilize around the slogans “We Are for Bolshevik Rule But without 
Communists!” and “Down with the Communists, Long Live Soviet Rule!” This 
emergent form of revolutionary subjectivity was closely connected to the politics 
of antisemitism. Internal Bolshevik security reports show that across Ukraine in 
mid-1919, sections of the peasantry and other social classes were deeply attached 
 
13  Christopher Ford, “The Crossroads of the European Revolution: Ukrainian Social-Democrats 
and Communists (Independentists), the Ukrainian Revolution and Soviet Hungary 1917-1920,” 
Critique 38/4 (2010): 573. As the Bolshevik N. Podvoiskii admitted in early August 1919, “the 
distinction between the city and the countryside in Ukraine strongly exacerbated national 
oppression,” YIVO Institute for Jewish Research (hereafter YIVO) RG80 Folder 48, 3852. 
14 Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial’no-politicheskoi istorii (Hereafter RGASPI) f.71 o.35 
d.691 l.2. Or, as the Bundist Moishe Rafes put it, the only “genuinely revolutionary proletarian 
elements in Ukraine were to be found in the mass of the proletariat of national minorities - 
Russians and Jews.” Borys, The Sovietization of Ukraine, 385.  
15 In its propaganda the Party tried to overcome the popular perception of the Bolsheviks as “non-
Ukrainian:” Tsentral’nyi Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Hromads’kykh Ob’iednan’ Ukrainy (hereafter 
TsDAHO) f.57 o.2 d.342 l.139 
16 See, for, example RGASPI f.17 o.6 d.369 l.112-113, 248.  
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to the pernicious Jew-Communist conflation.17 The fight for the popular 
conception of “Soviet rule” often became associated with a fight against “Jewish 
communism.”18 In Poltava in late April, for example, peasants shouted “down 
with the Yids, down with this Moscow Communist government, long live Soviet 
rule!”19 The spring and summer of 1919 would reveal just how entrenched these 
sentiments had become, including within the Bolsheviks’ own social base.  
 
 
The Elements of Red Army Antisemitism in Ukraine in 1919 
 
The principal agent of Red Army antisemitism in Ukraine in early 1919 was the 
partisan peasant soldier, mobilized by the Bolsheviks on the basis of a radical 
anti-bourgeois political project. This mobilization was crucial for the Bolshevik 
victory in Ukraine: according to Red Army Commander Vladimir Antonov-
Ovseenko, th1e Reds started out in late 1918 with some 7-8,000 troops, and by 
mid-February 1919 that number had risen sharply to over 46,000. This included 
at least 5,000 troops who had transferred directly from the Ukrainian Army to 
the Soviet Army. Even more substantial were the numbers of peasant militias (at 
least 14,000), who now aligned themselves to ad-hoc Red partisan units.20 
However, this was anything but a regular standing army. Writing in June 1919, 
Bolshevik leader Nikolai Podvoiskii claimed that an astonishing 90 percent of 
Soviet troops stationed in Ukraine were in fact composed of partisan and 
insurgent units.21 These nominally “Soviet,” ad-hoc Red Army units, 
overwhelmingly peasant by composition, tended to operate with little recourse 
to external control.22 They gave the Bolshevik leadership little cause to be 
 
17 TsDAHO f.1 o.20. d.35 l.11-12; Tsentral’nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv vyshchykh orhaniv vlady ta 
upravlinnia Ukrainy (hereafter TsDAVO) f.5 o.1 d.17 l.72.  
18 For the most comprehensive work to date on the overlap between left Ukrainian nationalism 
and antisemitism in 1919, see Christopher Gilley, “The Ukrainian Anti-Bolshevik Risings of 
Spring and Summer 1919: Intellectual History in a Space of Violence,” Revolutionary Russia 27/2 
(2014): 120; Id., “Otamanshchyna?: The Self-Formation of Ukrainian and Russian Warlords at 
the Beginning of the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries,” Ab Imperio 2015, 3 (2015): 83-84; 
Id., “Fighters for Ukrainian Independence? Imposture and Identity among Ukrainian Warlords, 
1917-22,” Historical Research 90/247 (2017): 183-184. 
19 TsDAVO f.5 o.1 d.17 l.64 
20  Vladimir Aleksandrovič Antonov-Ovseenko, Zapiski o grazhdanskoii voine. Tom 3 (Moscow: 
Gosudarstvennoe voennoe izdatel’stvo, 1932), 166-167. See also RGASPI f.71 o.35 d.507 l.79-82. 
21 RGASPI f.71 o.35 d.691 l.3 
22 RGASPI f.71 o.35 d.507 l.79-82 On the peasant composition of the Red partisan units, see 
Borys, The Sovietization of Ukraine, 1917-1923, 201. 
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confident of their allegiance.23 The centralization of the Red Army, so vigorously 
called for by Lenin and Stalin in 1919, was simply impossible in Ukraine.24 
 
In these circumstances, the Bolshevik leadership in Ukraine was heavily 
dependent on more reliable forces such as the International Division, a multi-
ethnic regiment composed of Jewish self-defense units and Chinese, Hungarian, 
Austrian, and German workers.25 Regiments of this kind often played a crucial 
role in putting down pogroms carried out by partisan Soviet units. However, 
from February onwards, Red Army Commander Antonov-Ovseenko repeatedly 
lost his most reliable troops as the Party center in Moscow ordered Red units to 
be sent from the Ukrainian front to fight on the southern and eastern fronts, 
where Admiral Kolchak was making westward gains on the Bolsheviks. The 
Ukrainian Bolsheviks were therefore forced to accelerate the formation of new 
partisan units and Red Guard detachments.26 Such was the scramble for troops 
that Antonov-Ovseenko was in no position to check and screen those who 
volunteered for the Reds. If partisans simply declared that they would fight for 
the Reds or that they would defeat the “bourgeois enemy,” they were accepted.27 
In contrast to the first Bolshevik government of 1917-1918 in Ukraine, which had 
relied predominantly on Russian Red Guards, this second Bolshevik campaign to 
secure power drew almost exclusively on a Ukrainian peasant social base.28 As 
 
23 Elias Heifetz, The Slaughter of the Jews in the Ukraine in 1919, (New York: Thomas Seltzer, 
1921), 89-90; Adams, Bolsheviks in the Ukraine, 133. 
24 Heifetz, The Slaughter of the Jews in the Ukraine in 1919, 89-90; Adams, Bolsheviks in the 
Ukraine, 133. See also RGASPI f.17 o.109 d.43 l.16-19ob. On Lenin‘s and Stalin’s call to centralize 
the Red Army, see S. M. Korolivskii, N. K. Kolensnik, and I. K. Rybalka, Grazhdanskaia voina na 
Ukraine 1918-1920, Tom vtoroi, (Kiev: Izdatel’stvo naukova duma, 1967), 1. 
25 See Adams, Bolsheviks in the Ukraine, 147-148; Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Armed: Trotsky, 
1879-1921, (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 428.  
26 Adams, Bolsheviks in the Ukraine, 147-148; Deutscher, The Prophet Armed, 428 and 439. 
27 Adams, Bolsheviks in the Ukraine, 148. 
28 Borys, The Sovietization of Ukraine, 194 and 201. This is captured in the memoirs of Zatonskii, 
a leading figure in the Soviet government in Ukraine: “[In 1919] we submitted to elements of the 
peasantry who, although very much sympathetic to Bolshevism, were nonetheless very 
suspicious, to say the least, of Communism. The peasant partisan enthusiastically interpreted our 
battle slogans during the period of the overthrow of the old regime, and saw us as willing allies in 
his fight against the landlords. But having won that fight, the partisan wanted one further thing: 
he wanted to be rid of everything foreign [chuzhdoe] and imposed [nanosnoe] (urban) so that he 
might finally be the master of his own land...[Previously] the Bolsheviks had said ‘arm yourself, 
beat the landlord and seize his land!” The Communists now say “give the state your bread, 
subject yourselves to discipline...give us your weapons’…it is no surprise that...they turned against 
us with almost the same ferocity with which they had risen up against the Hetman and Petliura.” 
V. P. Zatonskii, “Vodovorot (iz proshlogo),” in Etapy bol’shogo puti. Vospominaniia o 
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Podvoiskii noted in August 1919, “Bolshevism” in Ukraine had taken the form of 
agrarian partizanstvo, not the dictatorship of the proletariat.29 As its ranks 
swelled, the Red Army was approaching the size required to consolidate power 
in Ukraine. The political and ideological foundations of this army’s base, 
however, were deeply contentious.  
 
The consequences of this soon became apparent. As early as February 1919, 
internal Bolshevik reports began to note the depth of antisemitism in various 
units and divisions of the Red Army.30 By early April, reports indicated that Red 
Army divisions in Ukraine were composed of troops formerly attached to the 
army of the Ukrainian Directory. Needless to say, such divisions were plagued by 
antisemitism.31 On April 5, Podvoiskii gave a stark assessment of the situation 
facing the Bolsheviks: “we have, to our own detriment, absorbed not only 
counterrevolutionaries, not only White Guard scum, but even more so the 
masses of poor peasants [bedniakov]... who, having been mobilized previously 
by the counterrevolution, have fled that camp and now joined ours.”32 In sum, 
antisemitism had its basis in the overwhelmingly partisan composition of the 
Red Army in Ukraine; the worldview of the Bolsheviks’ social base contrasted 
sharply with that of the Party leadership.33  
 
Throughout March and April, the fragility of Soviet rule was cruelly exposed as 
various Red Army units rose up against the Bolsheviks. Ostensibly under the 
control of Red Army Commander Antonov-Ovseenko, these rebel units were, in 
actuality, loyal to their charismatic, independently minded leaders: otamany, self-
styled warlords, who frequently changed sides in the civil war.34 According to the 
head of the Ukrainian Soviet government, Khristian Rakovskii, between April 1 
and May 1, at least 93 uprisings occurred within the ranks of the Soviet Ukrainian 
 
grazhdanskoi voine, ed. V. D. Polikarpov, (Moskva: Voennoe izdatel’stvo ministerstva oborony 
SSSR, 1963), 155. I thank Dimitri Tolkatsch for bringing this source to my attention.  
29 YIVO RG80 folder 48, 3851. 
30 TsDAVO f.5 o.1 d.17 l.23-23ob  
31 For example, see the following report on the 2nd Red Army Division: TsDAHO f.1 o.20 d.35 l.5-
6. For more on the composition of the 2nd Division, see Korolivskii, Kolensnik and Rybalka, 
Grazhdanskaia voina na Ukraine 1918-1920. Tom pervyi, kniga pervaia, (Kiev: Izdatel’stvo 
naukova duma, 1967), 22. 
32 RGASPI f.71 o.35 d.507 l.80 
33 RGASPI f.272 o.1 d.81 l.65 
34 The name given to commanders of these partisan units - otamany - was a reference to 
Zaporozhian Cossack leaders from the Early Modern period, who were seen by Ukrainian 
nationalists as the true bearers of the Ukrainian national idea. See Gilley, “Otamanshchyna?”  
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Army.35 As they attacked buildings where soviets convened and shot Cheka 
agents, these rebels called for a “soviet rule” in its populist sense, that is, local self-
government without communes, without grain requisitioning, without 
“Communists” and, above all, without “Jews.” The uprisings revealed the 
extraordinary confluence between radical politics, Ukrainian nationalism, and 
antisemitism. Most threatening of all was the Grigor’evshchina of May 1919, the 
rebellion of Red Army units under the control of Nikifor Grigor’ev.36  
 
 
The Grigor’evshchina of May 1919  
 
A former officer in the Tsarist army during the First World War, Nikifor 
Grigor’ev initially sided with the German-backed Skoropads’kyi regime, before 
forming an alliance with the Ukrainian nationalist Petliura in 1918, when he 
commanded a number of partisan units in the south of Ukraine. In February 
1919, however, Grigor’ev joined forces with the Bolsheviks, a defection which 
crucially opened up the front to the Red Army. At a time when the most reliable 
Soviet armies were being taken out of Ukraine and sent to the eastern and 
southern fronts, Grigor’ev provided the vital military resources needed to secure 
the key cities and regions in the Ukrainian south. His newly constituted 1st 
Transdneprian Red Army Division was huge, and comprised of some 13-16,000 
 
35 Adams, Bolsheviks in the Ukraine, 233. 
36 Grigor’ev was but one of several military leaders who sided with the Bolsheviks during the civil 
war in Ukraine. One of the most notorious cases of this kind is the Ukrainian anarchist Nester 
Makhno. The question of antisemitism among Makhno’s troops is contested in the literature. 
Some, such as Аleksandr Shubin, argue that Makhno’s army was free of antisemitism, and 
wherever it did arise (and the cases were few and far between, argues Shubin), Makhno took 
strong measures against the perpetrators of violence. See Аleksandr Shubin, “The Makhnovist 
Movement and the National Question in the Ukraine, 1917-1921,” in Anarchism and Syndicalism 
in the Colonial and Postcolonial World, 1970-1940. The Praxis of National Liberation, 
Internationalism and Social Revolution, (London: Brill, 2010). However, in March 1935, the 
Jewish historian and chronicler of pogroms Elias Tcherikower wrote in a private correspondence: 
“There cannot be the slightest doubt that he [Makhno] is implicated in a series of pogroms. I 
have enough substantiated evidence in my archive to show that his men were exactly the same 
sort of bandits as all the others. Whether they perpetrated the pogroms with his permission or on 
their own initiative is difficult to say; either way – he is responsible...In some cases, he sternly 
punished his men for individual pogrom-excesses. In many cases, however, no punishment was 
meted out for pogroms... For me it suffices to know that the ordinary Jew in Ukraine consistently 
held Makhno for a pogromist and that the fear of Makhno was immense.” Tcherikower, Di 
ukrainer pogromen in yor 1919, 348. I thank Lars Fischer for bringing this quote to my attention. 
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soldiers, many of whom described themselves as “Bolshevik.”37 Their 
“Bolshevism,” however, differed markedly from the politics of Lenin and 
Trotsky: in Grigor’ev’s army, socialism meant defending peasant aims and 
supporting direct self-government at the local level; in other words, the popular 
peasant conception of “soviet rule,” with all its contradictory forms of 
consciousness.38 
 
On April 6, just as the short-lived Bavarian Soviet Republic was established in 
Munich, Grigor’ev proved his worth by taking Odessa from the occupying 
French and Greek armies. Rakovskii, the head of the Ukrainian Soviet 
government, could scarcely contain his delight: “Of all the glorious victories with 
which the Red Army has covered itself...the taking of Odessa has the greatest, 
worldwide significance... Long live the Red Army of Ukraine! Long live Red 
Odessa!”39 Yet the “Red Army” that captured Odessa was far from a communist 
army, and “Red Odessa” was far from “Bolshevik.” In actuality, the Bolshevik 
leadership in Ukraine was gambling the future of the Revolution on a partisan 
and highly contentious social base.40 
 
The following week, Bolshevik intelligence reports began noting that soldiers in 
Grigor’ev’s 6th Soviet Army were openly shouting slogans such as “Long live 
soviet rule! Down with the Communists! All Communists are Yids!”41 Although 
 
37 In his memoirs, Antonov-Ovseenko (1933, 131) put the figure at 13,000, whereas Zatonskii (1963, 
157) suggests it was nearer 16,000. On May 12, 1919, in a telegram to the Ukrainian Sovnarkom, 
Antonov-Ovseenko estimated the number at 15,000. See Antonov-Ovseenko, Zapiski o 
grazhdanskoii voine, Tom 4, 131; Zatonskii, “Vodovorot (iz proshlogo),” 157; Direktivy 
komandovaniia frontov Krasnoi Armii, 1917-1922. Sbornik dokumentov, Vol. 2, ed. T. F Kariaeva 
and N. N. Azovtsev, (Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel’stvo Ministerstva Oborony SSSR, 1971), 202. 
Grigor’ev’s unit would soon be further expanded and renamed the 6th Soviet Ukrainian Rifle 
Division. 
38 Heifetz, The Slaughter of the Jews in the Ukraine in 1919, 89-90; Adams, Bolsheviks in the 
Ukraine, 165. For information on the composition of Grigor’ev’s units, see TsDAHO f.57 o.2 
d.342 l.98. 
39 Antonov-Ovseenko, Zapiski o grazhdanskoii voine, Tom 3, 249-250. 
40 Adams, Bolsheviks in the Ukraine, 201. For a Menshevik take on Bolshevik rule in Odessa 
following the capture of the city by Grigor’ev’s troops, see Vladimir N. Brovkin, Dear Comrades: 
Menshevik Reports on the Bolshevik Revolution and the Civil War, (Stanford: Hoover Press, 
1991), 167-170.  
41 Bolshevik reports from mid-April detailing the extent of antisemitism within Grigor’ev’s units 
are discussed in Antonov-Ovseenko, Zapiski o grazhdanskoii voine. Tom 4, 75-80. See also 
TsDAVO f.5. o.1 d.17 l.55. Some reports sounded the alarm bell as far back as late March. A 
briefing by a political inspector for the Commissariat of Military Affairs on March 29, for 
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these reports were all sent to the Bolshevik Central Committee, the Party 
leadership continued to depend on Grigor’ev in the hope “that his military 
strength might be put to use,” as Commander of the Ukrainian Soviet Army, 
Antonov-Ovseenko, put it.42 As late as May 2, 1919, Antonov-Ovseenko 
dispatched a confidential memorandum to the Soviet government, advising it to 
maintain close cooperation with Grigor’ev, even praising him as “a local man” 
who has “always stood up against the oppressors of the peasantry.” While 
acknowledging Grigor’ev’s unpredictability, Antonov-Ovseenko asserted: “it 
should be quite possible to keep him under control.”43  
 
 
Fig. 2: Grigor’ev and Antonov-Ovseenko, Znamianka, April 1919 
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Григорьев,_Никифор_Александрович#/media/Файл:Grigoryev
_(green_insurgents).jpg 
 
example, noted that among Grigor’ev’s troops there was no political work being carried out and 
antisemitism was rampant Korolivskii, Kolensnik and Rybalka, Grazhdanskaia voina na Ukraine 
1918-1920. Tom pervyi, kniga vtoraia. (Kiev: Izdatel’stvo naukova duma, 1967), 278 and 332. 
42 Antonov-Ovseenko, Zapiski o grazhdanskoii voine. Tom 4, 79. 
43 The Russian Civil War: Documents from the Soviet Archives, eds. V. P. Butt et al., (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 1996), 85. 
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The gamble backfired. No sooner had the memorandum been sent, than a wave 
of ferocious antisemitic violence rushed forth from the ranks of Grigor’ev’s army. 
Buoyed by his recent victories, Grigor’ev now turned against the Soviet 
government, initiating the deadliest of all the civil war pogroms. In just eighteen 
days, his units, formerly attached to the Red Army and now in open revolt, 
carried out at least fifty-two pogroms, in which over 3,400 Jews were 
murdered.44 Although accounting for only a fraction of the total number of Jews 
killed in 1919, these massacres were distinguished by having the highest fatality 
rate of all the pogroms perpetrated during the Russian Civil War.45 
 
Despite a flurry of Party and central Soviet government decrees ordering 
Grigor’ev’s troops to be shot on the spot,46 the apparatuses of Soviet power in 
Ukraine were in no position to enforce these orders, given their lack of effective 
centralization and inability to rely on local forces. The seriousness of the 
situation came into view when one of the most dependable Soviet regiments, the 
1st Regiment of Red Cossacks, was pulled out of Kyiv and sent to fight against 
Grigor’ev at Kremenchuk. En route, it attacked Cheka units and started a 
pogrom in Lubny with the slogan “Death to the Yids and Communists.”47 
 
 
  
 
44 Grigor’ev’s troops carried out pogroms in Zlatopol (May 2-5); Znamenka (May 3); Lebedyn 
(May 5); Gorodishche (May 11-12; Zolotonosha, (May 12); Rotmistrivka (May 13-14); Matusovo 
(May 13-14); Belozerie (May 14-15); Smila (May 14-15); Elisavetgrad (May 15-17); Novomyrhorod 
(May 17); Cherkasy (May 16-21); Raihorod (May 20); Oleksandriia (May 22); Chyhyryn (May 25); 
Oleksandrivka (May 15-18); Stepanivka (May 18) and Semonivka (May 18-19). See Harvard 
University Library (hereafter HUL) f.3050 o.1 d.162 l.4 See also Heifetz, The Slaughter of the Jews 
in the Ukraine in 1919, 70; Sergei Ivanovich Gusev-Orenburgskii, Kniga o evreiskikh pogromakh 
na ukraine v 1919 g. Sostavlena po ofitsial’nym dokumentam, dokladam s mest i oprasam 
postradavshikh, (St. Peterburg-Berlin: Izdatel’stvo Z. I. Grzhebina, 1921), 10.; Id., Bagrovaia kniga. 
Pogromy 1919-1920 gg. na Ukraine, (New York: Ladoga, 1983), 7. Other reports estimate the total 
number of Jews murdered in the Grigor’evshchina at 6,000. See RGASPI f.272 o.1 d.81 l.92.  
45 Gergel, “The Pogroms in the Ukraine in 1918-1921,” 250. 
46 RGASPI f.71 o.35 d.500 l.38; TsDAHO f.57 o.2 d.305 l.39, 45-46; TsDAHO f.57 o.2 d.342 l.85-
86; Korolivskii, Kolensnik, and Rybalka, Grazhdanskaia voina na Ukraine 1918-1920. Tom pervyi, 
kniga pervaia., 33 and 48. For an appeal by the Odessa Bolsheviks against the Grigor’ev pogroms, 
see Documents of Soviet History. Volume 1. The Triumph of Bolshevism, 1917-1921, ed. Rex A. 
Wade, (New York: Academic International Press, 1991), 384-385. 
47 TsDAVO f.5 o.1 d.19 l.5 
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The Confluence of Antisemitism and Revolutionary Politics in Ukraine  
 
What the Grigor’evshchina revealed was the startling extent to which Bolshevik 
revolutionary discourse could overlap with antisemitic representations of 
Jewishness, and with devastating consequences. To give an illustration: on 
March 29, on the eve of his advance into Odessa, Grigor’ev issued a telegram to 
all Volunteer Army soldiers to “throw your generals into the sea, raise the Red 
Flag, put down your weapons and in place of ‘God Save the Tsar,’ come with us 
peacefully and sing ‘Arise, Arise, Working People’” [the opening lines of the 
chorus to the Russian version of The Worker’s Marseillaise].48 Just six weeks 
later, however, in a dramatic declaration of war against the Soviet state, Grigor’ev 
issued his defining statement, known as the Universal: 
 
Ukrainian people!...The political speculators have deceived you and, 
with clever methods, have taken advantage of your trustfulness. In place 
of land and freedom they have subjected you to the commune, to the 
Cheka, and to the commissars, those gluttonous Muscovites from the 
land where they crucified Christ.... Holy Toiler! Man of God! Look at 
your calloused hands and look around! Injustice! You are the Tsar of the 
land...but who governs you? All those who desire the blood of the 
people.... Down with the political speculators! ... Long live the power of 
the soviets of the people of Ukraine!49 
 
As part of a more general attack on a range of “exploiters” of the peasants, 
Grigor’ev was expressing a non-referential antisemitism. “The Jews” were not 
explicitly identified, but the key signifiers of an antisemitic discourse were all in 
place: the Ukrainians had been “deceived” by a more “clever” people; the specter 
of the “bloodsucker” was invoked; the “honest” workers with “calloused hands” 
are ruled by “Christ killers” and speculators. Here we see the signification of a 
well-worn antisemitic conception of “labor.” In contrast to the “non-
productive” Jew, stands the “real” toiler: the Ukrainian peasant, who, unlike “the 
Jew,” is engaged in “concrete,” “productive labor,” and holds an “organic” 
relation to the land and the nation.50 Later in the same declaration, Grigor’ev 
demanded the formation of new soviets based effectively on the notorious 
 
48 Adams, Bolsheviks in the Ukraine, 190. 
49 Antonov-Ovseenko, Zapiski o grazhdanskoii voine. Tom 4, 203-204. 
50 Moishe Postone, “Antisemitism and National Socialism: Notes on the German Reaction to 
‘Holocaust,’” New German Critique, 19 (January 1, 1980): 97-115. 
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numerus clausus quota system51: 80% of seats in the soviets were to be reserved 
for ethnic Ukrainians, and Jews were to be allocated no more than 5%. This is 
but one illustration of the explosive capacity for revolutionary discourse and 
populist anti-bourgeois sentiment in 1919 Ukraine to be expressed through 
antisemitism. 
 
Later, towards the end of his uprising in late May 1919, Grigor’ev’s antisemitism 
came into full view as he openly attacked what he called the “Yid” Soviet 
government. Yet his antisemitism remained wedded to a left populist discourse. 
In a series of leaflets addressed to Red Army soldiers, workers, and peasants, 
Grigor’ev proclaimed in one breath “Long live world socialist revolution, long 
live the International,” while in another he called on his troops to attack 
Bolshevik commissars, 99% of whom, he claimed, were “Yids.”52  
 
Grigor’ev’s rebellion provides an illustration of how lines of demarcation 
between revolutionary and counterrevolutionary, so clear in Bolshevik 
propaganda, could, in actuality, be fluid and porous. Radicalized peasants and 
workers moved between these categories. Grigor’ev was, in part, drawing upon 
the same experiential triggers that the Bolsheviks themselves had mobilized 
earlier in the year – class injuries, the desire for local control, left-populist 
resentment. What is more, Grigor’ev was recruiting from the very social base that 
the Bolsheviks had mobilized to come to power in the first place. In other words, 
antisemitism provided a nexus that enabled people to move between the 
seemingly antithetical categories of revolution and counterrevolution. The 
following two case studies in Elisavetgrad and Uman’ provide a vivid illustration 
of this.  
 
 
 
 
51 The numerus clausus was a quota system introduced in Tsarist Russia between 1882 and 1887, 
which set entry levels for Jews in education and various professions at 5-10%. Benjamin Nathans, 
Beyond the Pale: The Jewish Encounter with Late Imperial Russia, (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2002), 262-267. 
52 TsDAHO f.5 o.1 d.265 l.1341, 1346-1347. In one document, Grigor’ev denounces the “people’s 
provocateurs Rakovskii, Rafes, and Bronshtein-Trotsky,” whose rule has led “eighty percent of 
the laboring peasants of the land of Ukraine to fall into the hands of a few little Yids (zhidki) and 
political speculators” TsDAHO f.5 o.1 d.265 l.1349. I thank Dimitri Tolkatsch for bringing these 
documents to my attention. Grigor’ev’s leaflets around this time are also discussed in Gilley, 
“The Ukrainian Anti-Bolshevik Risings of Spring and Summer 1919,” 121, and in Gilley’s 
contribution to this Issue.  
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Elisavetgrad, May 1919 
 
During May 15-18, one of the most ferocious pogroms of the spring and summer 
of 1919 took place in Elisavetgrad (present day Kropyvnytskyi), a city located in 
central Ukraine in the north of Kherson province. Surrounded by a large peasant 
population, the city was home to the Elvorti agricultural equipment factory, 
which in 1917 employed more than 7,000 workers.53 In March 1919, the local 
Soviet state apparatuses were controlled largely by Left Socialist Revolutionaries 
(Left SRs) who, according to Bolshevik internal reports, frequently accused the 
Soviet government of being “a government of Yids.” However, such sentiments 
were hardly restricted to the Left SRs: the same reports note that the head of the 
local ispolkom – a Bolshevik named Ul’ianov54 – campaigned for Jews to be 
removed from local government and replaced by Orthodox Christians.55 The 
dynamic in the soviet did not fare much better: throughout February and March, 
there were speeches repeatedly demanding that the Jews be expelled from the 
soviet or pogroms would ensue.56 In one particular session of the soviet, 
seventeen of its representatives debated for four-and-a-half hours whether or not 
to “beat the Jews” before finally resolving to vote in the negative.57 Evidently, 
antisemitism was strongly pronounced in Elisavetgrad before the arrival of 
Grigor’ev’s troops.  
 
In mid-April, 3,000 of Grigor’ev’s partisans arrived in Elisavetgrad;58 by May 10, 
they had succeeded in dissolving the local Soviet government. Grigor’ev’s 
aforementioned Universal to the “Ukrainian people,” which depicted the 
Bolsheviks as “Christ killers,” was now plastered around the town. In a desperate 
attempt to hang on to power, a Soviet division of sailors from Odessa was sent to 
Elisavetgrad. Although they succeeded initially, when Grigor’ev’s troops 
 
53 http://www.chervonazirka.com/index.php?part=static&cname=about Accessed June 24, 2019. 
54 ‘Ul’ianov’ was apparently expelled from the Russian Communist Party in early 1919, but made 
his way back into Party work by moving to Elisavetgrad. TsDAHO f.1 o.20 d.91 l.25  
55 TsDAHO f.1 o.20 d.35 l.1 
56 O.K.K., Gody bor’by. Sbornik materialov po istorii revoliutsionnogo dvizheniia na 
zinov’evshchine, (Zinov’evsk: Okruzhnaia oktiabr’skaia komissiia, 1927), 78. 
57 Zvi Gitelman, Jewish Nationality and Soviet Politics: The Jewish Sections of the CPSU, 1917-
1930, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), 165. 
58 Antonov-Ovseenko, Zapiski o grazhdanskoii voine. Tom 4, 78. Grigor’ev’s unit was composed 
almost exclusively of peasants from the Kherson region. See HUL f.3050 o.1 d.130 l.1.  
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returned on May 15, many defected. Later that day, the very same Red sailors 
participated in a vicious pogrom in which at least 1,526 Jews were murdered.59 
 
On the morning of the pogrom, a committee of trade unionists, metalworkers, 
and members of the local Peasant Congress tried to put a stop to the massacre by 
forming armed detachments. The working class, however, was divided on the 
issue. On May 20, the local social democratic newspaper Nasha Zhizn’ (Our Life) 
reported that the pogrom had in fact been carried out not only by Grigor’ev 
units and Red sailors, but also by workers.60 Internal Bolshevik reports also 
indicate that those Communists who continued to fight against Grigor’ev (the 
majority of who were Jewish) were rounded up and shot by workers from the 
local Elvorti factory, the same factory from which the Bolsheviks had drawn their 
support throughout the preceding months.61 Furthermore, local (non-Jewish) 
members of the Party who had stayed after the arrival of Grigor’ev’s units also 
took part in the pogrom.62  
 
As is clear, antisemitism was a problem that crossed the military and political 
divide in Elisavetgrad. As one local Communist admitted in a frank telegram 
written in late June, “the entire work of Elisavetgrad Soviet institutions... 
including the Communists, is fundamentally compromised.”63  
 
 
Uman’, May-July 1919  
 
Even more shocking were the events that unfolded during the struggle for power 
in Uman’, a mid-sized town in central Ukraine in what was then Kyiv province 
(now Cherkasy oblast’). Its population in 1919 was around 60-65,000, the 
majority of whom were Jewish (approximately 35,000), with Russians and 
Ukrainians together making up 22,000.64 Soviet power was established in Uman’ 
 
59 HUL f.3035 o.1 d.130 l.1; TsDAHO f.1 o.20 d.91 l.25. See also Heifetz, The Slaughter of the Jews 
in the Ukraine in 1919, 244-245; Evgeniia B. Bosh, God Bor’by: bor’ba za vlast’ na Ukraine s 
aprelia 1917 g. do nemnetskoi okkupatsii, (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel’stvo, 1925), 89. The 
figure of 1526 is from a report by the Russian Red Cross: HUL f.3050 o.1 d.162 l.8. Other reports, 
however, put the number at 3,000: RGASPI f.71 o.35 d.486 l.412-413. 
60 HUL f.3050 o.1 d.130 l.33. One report even claimed that up to 75% of the pogromists were 
workers. HUL f.3050 o.1 d.130 l.12ob. 
61 TsDAHO f.1 o.20 d.91 l.25.  
62 TsDAHO f.1 o.20 d.91 l.25 
63 TsDAHO f.1 o.20 d.91 l.25ob 
64 Heifetz, The Slaughter of the Jews in the Ukraine in 1919, 316. 
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on the evening of March 11, when partisan units of the 8th Ukrainian Soviet 
Regiment pushed out the Directory army. Almost immediately, the same Soviet 
units engaged in an extensive pogrom, which was only brought to an end by the 
arrival of a second Soviet detachment.65 Following a brief occupation of the city 
by Ukrainian Cossack insurgents, who were no friends of the Jews,66 the 
pogrom-prone 8th Soviet Regiment again took the city on March 22. 
Antisemitism was not restricted to the Red Army, but was present in local Soviet 
state institutions as well. Within the Executive Committee, for example, Left SRs 
succeeded in expelling Jews from office. They did so by making the now familiar 
charge that true “soviet rule” had been taken out of the hands of the “toilers” and 
sabotaged by “strangers” and “foreigners;” in other words, by the Jews. At about 
the same time, an antisemitic campaign was also initiated by the local Ukrainian 
and Russian population in Uman’, who accused the Bolshevik “Yids” of closing 
down Orthodox churches.67  
 
This was the background to the arrival of Grigor’ev’s troops on May 12. The 
political field in Uman’ was one in which ostensibly pro-Bolshevik Red soldiers 
carried out pogroms; pro-soviet Left SRs successfully campaigned for the 
expulsion of Jews from the Executive Committee; and sections of the local 
population waged a populist campaign against the “Yid Soviet rule.” 
Antisemitism traversed the political divide in Uman’ in 1919. 
 
When Grigor’ev’s insurgents arrived and deposed the local Soviet government, 
they initiated a ferociously violent pogrom in which at least 300 Jews were 
murdered.68 In some cases, well known Soviet officials joined Grigor’ev’s troops 
in carrying out the assault.69 The pogrom was finally brought to an end on the 
 
65 I have been unable to determine which Soviet Regiment this was.  
66 According to a report of the Russian Red Cross, the Cossacks had murdered 300 Jews in the 
town of Teplyk. On arrival, they threatened to do the same in Uman’, but were apparently 
persuaded not to upon payment of contributions in kind in the shape of shoes and clothing, as 
well as money,. Miliakova, Kniga pogromov, 129. 
67 Miliakova, Kniga pogromov, 118-119; Gusev1-Orenburgskii, Bagrovaia kniga. Pogromy 1919-
1920 gg. na Ukraine, 83-85. 
68 P. F. Kurinnyi, Uman’ ta umanhany ochyma P. F. Kurinnogo (z osobystiyh shchodennikiv za 
1918-1929 rr.), (Uman’: Uman’skyi kraieznavchyi mysei, 2014), 208. I thank Dimitri Tolkatsch and 
Igor Opatskiy for bringing this source to my attention. Reports compiled by the Russian Red 
Cross in Ukraine detail entire families being massacred and tortured, with hands, feet, ears, noses 
and women’s breasts cut off. See Miliakova, Kniga pogromov, 122. 
69 Miliakova, Kniga pogromov, 124. 
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morning of May 22 by the arrival of the 7th Soviet Regiment.70 However, just 
three days later, the 7th Regiment was pulled out of Uman’ by the central 
authorities to put down uprisings in the surrounding provinces, and in its place 
returned the dreaded 8th Soviet Ukrainian Regiment, the same unit responsible 
for the pogrom in March.71 With its return came a new wave of pogromist 
violence every bit as brutal as the first. Reports by the Russian Red Cross in 
Ukraine72 give details of armed Red soldiers stopping civilians on the street to ask 
“are you a Yid?” Those who did not answer convincingly were mercilessly 
beaten.73 Jews who dared appear in public to go to synagogue had to run a 
gauntlet of soldiers from the 8th Soviet Army, who would stand outside shouting 
“who is your god?”74 
 
The situation in Uman’ is illustrative not only of the extent of antisemitic 
violence within sections of the Red Army, but also of the inability of the Soviet 
government to stop it, even when there was a desire to do so at the local level. As 
the pogrom raged from May 22 on, local Communist Party cells tried to fight the 
8th Soviet Regiment, and several orders making pogroms punishable by death 
were issued. While local Bolsheviks did succeed in ensuring that ten Red Army 
pogromists were shot by firing squads, they were unable to halt the violence. 
Despite repeated appeals by Bolsheviks to the central authorities in Kyiv that the 
8th Regiment be immediately dissolved, relieved of its duties, and replaced by 
another, non-antisemitic unit, there were no such forces at the state’s disposal. 
Consequently, the 8th Regiment remained in Uman’ throughout the month of 
June.75 Perhaps most controversially, according to reports by the Russian Red 
 
70 According to the Ukrainian Left SR newspaper Bor’ba, Soviet troops did not arrive in Uman’ 
until May 23 RGASPI f.71 o.35 d.486 l.217-219. However, a memoir from a local Uman’ lawyer 
suggests the Red Army arrived at 9 o’clock on the morning of the 22nd. See Kurinnyi, Uman’ ta 
umanhany ochyma, 205. 
71 This was an enlarged 8th Regiment now totaling some 2,100 troops RGASPI f.71 o.35 d.498 
l.167ob. The Regiment just two weeks earlier had carried out a pogrom in Haisyn, a town in 
central Ukraine. Committee of the Jewish Delegations. The Pogroms in the Ukraine under the 
Ukrainian Governments (1917-1920). Historical Survey with Documents and Photographs. 
(London: John Bale, Sons and Danielsson, ltd., 1927), 228, 232.  
72 The Russian Red Cross was legalized by the Ukrainian Soviet government in 1919 and was 
allowed to exist until 1921. See Miliakova, Kniga pogromov, 849. In mid-late 1919, it carried out 
extensive investigations into pogroms and collected testimonies by survivors and witnesses. See, 
for example, the files in TsDAHO f.1 o.20 d.126. 
73 Miliakova, Kniga pogromov, 126. See also Kurinnyi, Uman’ ta umanhany ochyma, 209. 
74 Jeffrey Veidlinger, Pogrom: The Origins of the European Genocide of the Jews, (New York: 
Metropolitan Books, 2020), 282. 
75 Miliakova, Kniga pogromov, 127. 
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Cross, the 8th Regiment was intentionally kept in Uman’ by the Bolshevik 
leadership because it had proven itself more than capable of maintaining “soviet 
rule” by fending off various rebel movements throughout late May and June.76 
In six weeks of violence, the 8th Regiment killed approximately 150 Jews.77 To be 
clear: in the spring and early summer of 1919, the Bolsheviks were kept in power 
in Uman’ by and through militarized antisemitism embodied by the 8th Soviet 
Regiment. 
 
Finally, on July 3, the 8th Regiment was replaced by the First Ukrainian Soviet 
Cavalry under the command of Fedor Gribenko.78 However, this force proved to 
be just as antisemitic as its predecessor: upon arrival, Soviet cavalrymen robbed 
and attacked Jewish neighborhoods while declaring that they were there to fight 
“the Yids and the Communists.” It was only with the arrival of the multi-ethnic 
“International 4th Soviet Regiment” on July 5 that two months of anti-Jewish 
violence at the hands of the Soviet military were finally brought to an end. The 
International 4th Regiment was composed of Jewish self-defense groups, as well 
as Chinese, Hungarian, German, and Russian workers.79 More pogroms would 
follow in Uman’ in late July, but these would be carried out by anti-Bolshevik 
peasant insurgents. This time, the new Soviet government, backed by the 
International 4th Regiment, took an unconditional stance in opposition to the 
violence.80 
 
 
  
 
76 Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi voennyi arkhiv (Hereafter RGVA), f.103 o.1 d.49 l.355-356. I wish to 
thank Dimitri Tolkatsch for bringing this source to my attention. See also Miliakova, Kniga 
pogromov, 127; Heifetz, The Slaughter of the Jews in the Ukraine in 1919, 87-88. 
77 Veidlinger, Pogrom: The Origins of the European Genocide of the Jews, 282. 
78 For more on Gribenko, see Miliakova, Kniga pogromov, 850; Zatonskii, “Vodovorot (iz 
proshlogo),” 160. 
79 When the International 4th Division arrived in Uman’, the pogrom-prone First Soviet Cavalry 
was sent to Poltava. See Miliakova, Kniga pogromov, 118-130. Other sources give the date of the 
arrival of the 4th Division as July 8. See Kurinnyi, Uman’ ta umanhany ochyma, 223. Often, the 
International 4th Division proved the most reliable Soviet unit in Ukraine and the one most 
capable of confronting anti-Jewish violence in the Red Army. On the Division, see Kelly 
Johnson, “Sholem Schwarzbard: Biography of a Jewish Assassin,” (PhD Dissertation, Harvard 
University, 2012), 111-112.  
80 University of Glasgow, Russian Revolutionary Literature Collection, Reel 47, Document 1162. 
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The Grigor’evshchina in the Spring and Summer of 1919 
 
These were not isolated incidents. In Cherkasy, a city 190 kilometers northeast of 
Uman’ on the River Dnieper, a substantial section of local Bolsheviks openly 
interpreted the struggle against the bourgeoisie as one against “Jewish 
speculators.”81 When Grigor’ev’s troops arrived there on May 10, a call was 
immediately issued for self-defense units to be formed within the trade unions. 
However, local “Christian” workers refused, leaving 100-200 Jews to defend 
themselves (all were reportedly killed).82 The pogrom by Grigor’ev’s troops in 
Cherkasy commenced on May 16 and lasted for five days. In the ensuing violence, 
some 617 Jews were murdered.83 Reports stated that “Christian” workers in the 
trade unions’ soviet either took part in the violence or were indifferent to it84. 
When local Bolshevik leaders tried to mobilize their Red Army division to put 
down the violence, copies of Grigor’ev’s Universal were found circulating among 
the soldiers waiting to depart. When they were ordered to fight, sections of the 
Red Army refused, and declared their intention to side instead with Grigor’ev. 
When asked why they had defected, they stated their agreement with the 
Universal.85 Although a Red Army regiment did eventually put up a fight against 
Grigor’ev’s troops, testimonies by local Red soldiers reveal how those who 
defected to Grigor’ev did so on the grounds that Christian “brothers” should 
unite to fight the “Communist Yids.”86 
 
Similar developments occurred in the town of Zolotonosha, in Poltava province, 
where the Bogunskii regiment of the Red Army was stationed.87 The regiment 
was utterly pervaded with antisemitism, and had perpetrated pogroms back in 
February.88 In mid-April, prior to their arrival in Zolotonosha, Bogunskii 
soldiers apparently tore off the Red stars on their uniform, shouting “this is a Yid 
star!” The regiment’s antisemitism was further underlined with the arrival of 
Grigor’ev’s troops on May 12, which saw Bogunskii soldiers defect en masse and 
 
81 Heifetz, The Slaughter of the Jews in the Ukraine in 1919, 251. 
82 HUL f.3050 o.1 d.162 l.17ob. For more on Jewish self-defence units in Cherkasy, see RGASPI 
f.272 o.1 d.81 l.90-91 
83 Miliakova, Kniga pogromov, 351. 
84 Heifetz, The Slaughter of the Jews in the Ukraine in 1919, 257. 
85 Gilley, “The Ukrainian Anti-Bolshevik Risings of Spring and Summer 1919,” 114. 
86 Miliakova, Kniga pogromov, 140-141; Heifetz, The Slaughter of the Jews in the Ukraine in 1919, 
268-269. For more on the aftermath of the Cherkasy pogrom, see Johnson, “Sholem 
Schwarzbard,” 111-13.  
87 On the composition of the Bogunskii regiment, see Miliakova, Kniga pogromov, 856.  
88 See Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rosiiskoi Federatsii (Hereafter GARF) f.1318 o.1 d.426 l.5-5ob. 
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help carry out a pogrom under the slogan “Down with Jewish rule!” When asked 
by a local Bolshevik why they had deserted the Red Army, Bogunskii soldiers 
answered: “because they [Grigor’ev’s troops] stand for Soviet Rule, but they also 
kill the Yids and Communists.”89 
 
 
Beyond Grigor’ev: Antisemitism in the Red Army and Party in 1919 
 
The Grigor’evshchina was an expression of a much deeper problem of 
antisemitism within the apparatuses of Bolshevik authority at the local level in 
Ukraine in 1919. Intelligence reports sent to the Party Central Committee in 
April and May make clear that antisemitism was embedded within the Red 
Army across the whole of Ukraine, including many of those regiments and 
brigades that did not carry out pogroms.90 Although the wave of pogromist 
violence subsided after May,91 reports from June and July show that antisemitism 
continued to be a profound problem within the Red Army and local Bolshevik 
and Soviet institutions.92 The situation was so grave in some regions that 
Bolshevik agitators simply could not go near the Red Army for fear that they 
would be shot on the spot as “Yid speculators.”93 Typical of such reports was an 
inspection carried out into the Ukrainian Soviet 1st Army in early June, which 
concluded that “political work among the troops is entirely impossible” owing to 
antisemitism, which is so “strongly developed... pogroms have become a regular 
occurrence” (obychnoe iavlenie).94 Bolsheviks who wished to disseminate 
propaganda against antisemitism faced equally challenging circumstances in 
many rural regions. In Lityn (Podolia province) and Fastiv (Kyiv province), the 
 
89 TsDAHO f.1 o.20 d.35 l.116, 121-123; f.5 o.1 d.17 l.55; TsDAVO f.5 o.1 d.17 l.61; HUL f.3050 o.1 
d.162 l.4ob; RGASPI f.272 o.1 d.81 l.65. See also Gusev-Orenburgskii, Bagrovaia kniga. Pogromy 
1919-1920 gg. na Ukraine, 9; Gilley, “The Ukrainian Anti-Bolshevik Risings of Spring and 
Summer 1919,” 114.  
90 Security reports for the months of April and May show that antisemitism found traction in 
Red Army units all across Ukraine, from the regions of the north such as the Volyn oblast’, 
Konotop, and Berdychiv; to Bila Tserkva, Poltava, Vasylkiv, Oleksandriia, Koziatyn, and Kryvyi 
Rih in central Ukraine; and from Konstantingrad (present day Krasnohrad) and Donetsk in the 
east, to Ochakiv and Kherson in the south and Koziatyn in the west. See the reports held in 
TsDAHO f.1 o.20 d.35 l.40-42, 126-128, 156-158; f.1 o.20 d.41 l 2-12, 25; f.57 o.2 d.283 l.19-21; and 
RGASPI f.17 o.6 d.369 l.109-111; f.71 o.35 d.507 l.363-394. 
91 HUL f.3050 o.1 d.162 l.4ob-6 
92 RGASPI f.71 o.35 d.507 l.363-394; f.71 o.35 d.489 l.251-292; TsDAVO f.5 o.1 d.20 l.6-30 
93 TsDAHO f.1 o.20 d.35 l.95, 146-148; f.5 o.1 d.17 l.23-23ob 
94 TsDAHO f.1 o.20 d.35 l.95 
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local Party had virtually no contact with the peasant population, which on more 
than one occasion rose up against the regime with the slogan “We are the 
Bolsheviks, beat up the Yids!”95 The disjuncture between the Party leadership 
and rural communities was often considerable: one report from the Pustovoity 
village, in the Vinnytsia province, revealed that local peasants had no 
information about what Soviet rule was; nor did they know which party was in 
power in Moscow. They were, however, convinced that the Bolsheviks were all 
“Yids.”96  
 
Similar difficulties appeared within the Party itself. In Fastiv, for example, a 
report noted that of the twenty-two Communists in the local Party organization 
in mid-June, only two were actual card-carrying members, the rest being 
antisemitic “Petliura agitators.” Membership, so the report indicated, was being 
coordinated through inter-personal friendship groups, and the antisemites in the 
Party could not be arrested such was their dominance.97 Again, it is important to 
note that these were not isolated cases.98 In some regions, antisemitism had 
become so pervasive that local Party and soviet organizations had split into 
opposing camps. In Lipovets (Kyiv province), for example, the soviet was 
composed of sixty Communist Bundists, twenty Mensheviks, and twenty 
Bolsheviks. The principal divide, however, was not a party one: according to a 
local Party report written in mid-May, the soviet was split along ethnic lines, 
with the Jewish and Russian groups effectively operating as separate, opposing 
camps.99 In Ovruch (Zhytomyr region), the local Communist organization was 
similarly divided between a non-Jewish group which “openly tried to start 
pogroms” and a Jewish group composed of “honest workers.” The report 
concluded by demanding that the Central Committee immediately replace the 
antisemitic individuals with “real Communists.”100  
 
 
95 TsDAHO f.1 o.20 d.35 l.78-81,162  
96 RGASPI f.71 o.35 d.489 l.118 
97 TsDAHO f.1 o.20 d.35 l.142-143 
98 See, for example, the following reports sent to the Party Central Committee in June 1919: 
TsDAHO f.1 o.20 d.35 l.118-119,127-128,139-141; TsDAHO f.1 o.20 d.41 l.19 and RGASPI f.71 o.35 
d.507 l.374. As an article about pogroms and counterrevolutionary sentiment in the Kharkiv 
Bolshevik daily Kommunar put it: “the great hindrance and deficiency of our [Party] work 
derives from the complete absence of conscious party workers in the provinces” Kommunar 57 
(71) p1. 29/5/1919.  
99 TsDAHO f.1 o.20 d.35 l.86-87 
100 TsDAHO f.1 o.20 d.35 l.78-81. Similar cases were reported in Fastiv: TsDAHO f.1 o.20 d.35 
l.142-143 
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Yet the central authorities were simply in no position to effect such changes. 
Illustrative of this is the fact that on May 30, just a few days after the 
Grigor’evshchina, a meeting of the Cheka and Soviet government leadership 
declared that responsibility for dealing with local outbreaks of 
“counterrevolution” rested at the local level, in soviet institutions such as the 
Executive Committees.101 However, these were precisely the bodies that were at 
times complicit in antisemitic violence during the spring and summer of 1919. 
The central authorities often tried to send “honest Communists” to the 
provinces, to ensure some stability. However, in some cases, things did not work 
out as planned: in Pavlohrad (a town in Ekaterinoslav Governorate), the 
“Communist” sent by the Party center, a man named “Panov,” turned out to be 
an antisemite.102 This, again, was not an isolated case.103 Such was the separation 
between the center and the periphery, that Bolshevik leaders were simply unable 
to check the composition of Party organizations at the local level; as such, these 
institutions were often staffed by antisemites over whom the leadership had little 
control.104 All of this led the Central Bureau of the Jewish Sections of the 
Communist Party (the Evsektsiia) to conclude in late 1919 that Jewish workers 
were “often the only source of local resistance” to Red Army pogroms and anti-
Soviet uprisings in mid-1919.105 
 
 
Antisemitism in the Red Army: Towards an Understanding  
 
Faced with this unprecedented explosion of anti-Jewish violence, Bolshevik 
leaders tried to initiate an extensive campaign against antisemitism in the 
summer of 1919.106 Yet they faced great difficulties in doing so, since many within 
 
101 TsDAVO f.2 o.1 d.25 l.72 
102 TsDAHO f.1 o.20 d.35 l.24 
103 Reports by the Information Bureau of the Ukrainian Commissariat for Military Affairs make 
it clear that in Vasil’kov (Kyiv), the “Communists” sent from the center to put a stop to peasant 
uprisings were themselves interpolated by antisemitism. RGVA f.25860 o.1 d.148 l.81ob. I thank 
Dimitri Tolkatsch for bringing this source to my attention.  
104 TsDAHO f.1 o.20 d.35 l.40-42,118-119; f.57 o.2 d.342 l.30-33. A report by the Poalei Zion in June 
1919 (sent to Lenin) complained that several Red Army units responsible for carrying out 
pogroms had yet to be disbanded. Similarly, it warned that “openly counterrevolutionary 
bandits” continued to occupy key positions in local apparatuses of the Soviet government. 
RGASPI f.272 o.1 d.141 l.18-19. 
105 RGASPI f.445 o.1 d.1 l.78. Emphasis original.  
106 See Brendan McGeever, Antisemitism and the Russian Revolution, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2019).  
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the Bolsheviks’ social base in Ukraine saw no contradiction between fighting for 
“soviet rule” and against “Jewish exploiters.” All too frequently, the 
revolutionary visions conjured up by radicalized peasants in Ukraine overlapped 
and combined with antisemitism.  
 
Critical Theory can help us to understand why. In Ukraine in 1919, a key feature 
of antisemitism was the representation of “the Jew” as a holder of power, a bearer 
of a “foreign” and distinctively exploitative class position. As late theorist Moishe 
Postone once noted, in moments of crisis antisemitism “can appear to be anti-
hegemonic.” Its particular danger for socialists and anti-capitalists, he argued, lies 
in its unique configuration “as a fetishized form of oppositional consciousness, 
[as] the expression of a movement of the little people against an intangible, 
global form of domination.”107 In 1919, popular interpretations of “Bolshevism” 
proved to be susceptible to precisely this dynamic. Many radicalized peasants and 
workers in Ukraine fought for a populist conception of Soviet authority, a power 
of “the people” (narod), of the “laboring people” (trudiashchiesia), against the 
capitalists, the speculators, the exploiters. These were standard categories of 
revolutionary Bolshevism, and as far as Bolshevik leaders were concerned, they 
were precisely the kinds of concepts that were best equipped to cut through 
racialized discourse and show the way towards a true class consciousness.  
 
However, in the Ukrainian revolutionary conjuncture, class and ethnic categories 
could not be easily separated. Indeed, the terms “Ukrainian” and “Jew” 
simultaneously bore both class and ethnic overdeterminations. “Ukrainians” 
were “true” and “honest” “toilers” who put their hands to “productive” labor. 
“The Jew,” in addition to being a “Communist,” was a “non-laborer,” a 
“speculator.” In other words, the categories Bolshevik leaders deployed in their 
class analysis – “bourgeois,” “toiler,” “the people,” “exploiter,” and “exploited” – 
were, on the ground, understood in profoundly complex and racialized ways.108 
 
107 Moishe Postone, “History and Helplessness: Mass Mobilization and Contemporary Forms of 
Anticapitalism,” Public Culture 18/1 (2006): 99.  
108 The place of “speculation” or petty trade in popular conceptions of Jewishness has been 
addressed in Andrew Sloin’s pioneering work on Bolshevik rule in Belorussia. For Sloin, the 
Soviet state’s designation of “speculation” as a criminal (not to mention “counterrevolutionary”) 
activity coincided and often overlapped with the widespread antisemitic identification of 
“speculation” as a defining feature of Jewishness. There was a “tendency inherent in the Soviet 
project,” writes Sloin, “to conflate Jewish economic practices with the workings of “merchant 
capital” and problematically impute to Jewish actors a certain agency over basic economic 
functions.” See Andrew Sloin, “Speculators, Swindlers and Other Jews: Regulating Trade in 
Revolutionary White Russia,” East European Jewish Affairs 40/2 (2010): 112. 
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Revolutionary class discourse was taken up in social struggles that were shaped 
not only by class antagonisms, but also by the politicization of ethnicity, 
antisemitism especially. It was in this context that slogans such as “Smash the 
Yids, long live Soviet rule!” gained such traction.  
 
The mobilization of the Ukrainian peasantry around an anti-bourgeois populist 
politics had brought the Bolsheviks to power in Ukraine in early 1919. By the 
spring and summer, however, that same social base turned against the regime in 
an unprecedented wave of anti-Jewish violence. Red Army antisemitism was not 
confined to 1919, but would resurface in the Soviet-Polish war in the summer of 
1920 and in different locales in 1921, as well.109 When the Bolshevik leadership 
responded to antisemitism during the Russian Revolution, therefore, their 
confrontation was with an antisemitism that had become entrenched within 
sections of the Party’s support base.110 Ukraine in 1919 would show, with 
devastating consequences, the extent to which class could become racialized, and 
radical ideas be taken up on the ground in ways over which the Party leadership 
had little control. This explosive overlap between class politics and antisemitic 
representations of Jewishness proved to be the Party’s biggest challenge. 
Although Red Army antisemitism culminated in just a fraction of the civil war 
pogroms, it posed the most serious test of the Bolshevik promise to build a world 
free of exploitation and domination. 
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